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THE EFFECTS OF MALPRACTICE TORT REFORM ON DEFENSIVE MEDICINE
Katherine D. Hennesy
and
Heather M. O’Neill
Ursinus College
ABSTRACT
Positive defensive medicine occurs when physicians order additional tests or procedures primarily to avoid 
malpractice liability.   This paper shows the degree of defensive medicine occurring across states is related to the 
malpractice environment in the states.  As the environment changes due to malpractice tort reform, defensive 
medicine practices also change.  This paper shows the existence of positive defensive medicine and how it adds to 
total health care expenditures for head trauma victims in 23 states in 2000.  Moreover, given different malpractice 
environments across states, we witness variations in defensive medicine practices leading to differences in health 
care expenditures.
INTRODUCTION
Doctors march on state capitols to bring attention to the 
rising cost of malpractice insurance premiums.  
Although declining reimbursements by private health 
insurers and the federal government have hurt 
physicians’ incomes, the chief culprit in the doctors’ 
dissatisfaction is rising malpractice insurance 
premiums.  While malpractice tort reform is debated in 
state capitols and reforms are undertaken, another 
implication needs to be addressed.  How does the 
malpractice environment affect doctors’ decisions in 
treating patients and do these decisions contribute to 
higher health care costs?   
The behavioral response of doctors to liability concerns 
is called defensive medicine.  Positive defensive 
medicine occurs when physicians order additional tests 
or procedures primarily to avoid malpractice liability. 
Negative defensive medicine occurs when doctors 
avoid seeing risky patients.  Since the early 1970’s 
economists, lawyers, and those within the medical 
community have debated the existence of defensive 
medicine.  While recent economic analyses support the 
idea that physicians practice defensive medicine, 
complexities surrounding the topic have prevented 
economists from discerning its pervasiveness and direct 
contribution to health care costs.  Given the role 
defensive medicine plays in health care and the scarcity 
of studies that link it to the malpractice environment, 
this study examines positive defensive medicine across 
states in light of differences in the states’ malpractice 
environments.  
MALPRACTICE THEORY AND PRACTICE
According to Danzon (1994), professional liability 
systems are necessary in situations where asymmetric 
information exists.  Physician’s extensive use of 
medical jargon and patients’ inabilities to understand 
such terminology is just one example of the information 
gap that exists in medicine.  Thus, the purpose of a 
liability system like the medical malpractice system is 
twofold; it is meant to both to deter negligence and 
compensate patients injured as a result of negligent 
care.   A person is deemed injured if and only if the 
injury was preventable and it was reasonable to 
undertake preventive activities. Thus, adverse outcomes 
resulting from normal risks of medical procedures 
should not be considered under the medical malpractice 
negligence rule.
Regarding liability insurance, economic theory states 
that premiums should reflect the expected cost of 
claims based on individual physician’s standards of 
care. Theory predicts that experience rating malpractice 
premia ensure that the physicians sued most often pay 
the highest malpractice premia, not unlike the 
automobile driver who pays the highest insurance rates 
because of multiple accidents.  However, this is not the 
standard practice. Malpractice premia are experience 
rated across specialties, but not across doctors within a 
region within a specialty. A community rating is used 
within a specialty across regions.   For example, the 
Philadelphia Inquirer (2003) reports an obstetrician in 
Philadelphia paid on average $140,000 per year for 
malpractice insurance, compared to $67,000 in Los 
Angeles, indicating different community ratings across 
states.  These state variations in premia are the result of 
the malpractice tort law itself, since these laws are 
created by state legislatures.  For instance, statute of 
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limitations, capped damages, etc. vary across the 
country.
Experience ratings differ across specialties with riskier 
practices, say obstetrics, paying more. An orthopedic 
surgeon in Philadelphia only paid $115,000 on average
in 2003 compared to the above obstetrician, according 
to the Philadelphia Inquirer (2003). Experience rating 
within a specialty could have the effect of retarding 
new technological procedures, which is why it is not 
used.  It would effectively punish the doctors utilizing 
new, perhaps initially riskier techniques, causing 
doctors to shy away from newly emerging procedures.  
Such incentives could retard the forward movement of 
technological medical procedures. In addition to 
specialty rating, malpractice premia are also experience 
rated by location.  Physicians from locales with above 
average suit awards will have higher premia due to 
higher insurer payouts.  Frequency and severity 
variations within a state result in regional specialty 
specific premia variations. As such, Philadelphia 
orthopedic surgeons paid $7,000 more on average than 
doctors in adjacent Montgomery County due to 
Philadelphia’s high jury payouts, according to the 
Philadelphia Inquirer (2003). 
Unfortunately, the community rated system has its own 
disadvantages.  Because physicians are grouped by 
specialty, they may experience premium increases if 
claim volume or claim awards grow within their 
specialty, regardless of their personal malpractice 
claims history.  At this point, insurance companies are 
not offering hybrid pricing systems combining the 
advantages of both community and experience rating; 
community rating is the standard pricing technique.  
Malpractice laws reside within state civil codes, either 
tort or contract, although there has been some 
discussion of instituting federal laws.  The litigation 
process involves three steps, each of which increases 
litigation expenses.  In the first step plaintiffs file suit.  
Lawyers screen potential cases due to the US tradition 
of contingency-based legal fees. If expected costs of 
litigation are less than the expected payout, a suit is 
filed.  In pretrial discovery, the second step of litigation, 
defendants and plaintiffs exchange information by 
releasing medical records and naming expert witnesses, 
and the plaintiff officially names medical personnel 
involved in the incident.  The third step of litigation, 
trial or settlement, is preceded in some states by 
voluntary or mandatory arbitration, which offer 
incentives to settle out of court by eliminating costs 
associated with trial.
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF DEFENSIVE 
MEDICINE
There are three methods to determine the existence and 
magnitude of defensive medicine: direct physician 
surveys; hypothetical clinical scenarios; and healthcare 
utilization studies. An OTA (1994) review of direct 
physician surveys shows physicians do practice both 
positive and negative defensive medicine.  Sixteen 
studies reviewed by OTA found anywhere from 21 to 
81 percent of physicians ordered additional tests out of 
fear of litigation. It is difficult to determine from these
surveys, however, how often and to what extent it is 
practiced. 
A second branch of literature uses physician surveys to 
assess actions given specific clinical situations.  An 
advantage of this type of survey is the ability to focus 
on physician specialties and clinical scenarios in which 
defensive medicine is a concern. In an OTA (1994) 
study, the percentage of respondents who chose 
“malpractice concerns” as the primary reason for 
administering a clinical action ranged from 4.9 (back 
pain scenario) to 29.0 percent (head trauma scenario). It 
was estimated the aggregate cost of defensive Cesarean 
deliveries to be $8.7 million in 1991 compared to the 
aggregate cost of defensive diagnostic radiology of the 
head for Americans ages 5 to 24 to be $45 million.
While these studies provide an additional verification of
the existence of defensive medicine, their hypothetical 
basis limits their predictive power and creates bias.  
Thus, a third branch of defensive medicine statistically 
analyzes the impact of liability risk on health care 
utilization.  For example, Localio et. Al. (1993)
examine the relationship between malpractice liability 
risk and the rates of Cesarean deliveries in a sample of 
New York state hospitals in 1984. The authors found 
that a patient in a hospital with high frequency obstetric 
malpractice claims was 32 percent more likely to 
undergo a Cesarean delivery than a patient in a hospital 
with low claim frequency.  
PAST NATIONAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
CRISES AND TORT REFORM
Literature on malpractice has identified two previous 
times during which the system was in crisis: one in the 
1970’s and one in the 1980’s. Danzon (1984) cites
stock market volatility and long claims tails as major 
contributors to the depletion in insurance capital in the 
1970s.  Both encouraged insurers to seek large
premium increases to shore up depleted capital reserves 
in 1974-75. These premium increases led to crises in 
which physicians had difficulty paying for malpractice 
premiums.
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Harrington and Danzon (1984) contend the 1980s crisis 
was the result of price undercutting and inadequate risk 
information.  They believe the largest insurers
deliberately underreported claims and used reinsurance 
to hide losses.  Additionally, Danzon (1983) also finds
the rising cost of malpractice claims due to pro-plaintiff 
trends in laws, erosion of traditional malpractice 
defenses (like the locality rule and charitable 
immunity), growth in the number and complexity of 
medical treatments, an increase in the number of 
lawyers per capita, and erosion of the patient-physician 
relationship leading to higher insurance rates.
In response to the malpractice crises occurring in the 
1970’s and 1980’s, states enacted various tort reforms. 
Some are termed “indirect” reforms in that they 
indirectly reduce malpractice awards.  Barker (1992) 
notes several indirect reforms following the first two 
crises. He indicates 34 states reduced their statute of 
limitations to two to three years and many decreased 
the length of time permitted for injury discovery.  
Several reforms that “directly” reduced awards also 
followed the crises. After 1975, nine states enacted 
reforms capping malpractice awards values; seven 
states capped total damage awards while two states 
capped only noneconomic damages of pain and 
suffering.  Several states created Patient Compensation 
Funds (PCF), in which physicians were responsible for 
awards up to a certain dollar amount, after which the 
PCF paid the rest of the award due.  Modification of the 
collateral source rule was also enacted.  Originally, this 
rule prohibited evidence of collateral award sources to 
be introduced to the jury.  Reform allowed juries to 
consider, and sometimes mandated, that they lower 
awards when plaintiffs had collateral award sources.  
These collateral sources could include other physicians, 
hospitals, or insurance companies.  By enacting such 
reforms, plaintiffs could no longer receive duplicate 
malpractice awards from multiple sources; it eliminated 
double dipping.
To reduce costs associated with litigation, three major 
reforms were enacted. First, some states mandated 
pretrial screening.  This reform required potential cases 
be screened by a panel before proceeding to trial; cases 
deemed unworthy did not reach trial, thus eliminating 
unnecessary trial expenses.  Barker (1992) shows 
thirteen states created provisions for arbitration, either 
voluntary or mandatory, between pretrial discovery and 
trial, in order to eliminate expenses associated with 
trial.  Under the process of arbitration, plaintiffs and 
defendants submit their claim to a third party who
makes a decision regarding the case outcome.  Under 
mandatory arbitration third party decisions are binding 
and cannot be appealed.  A third reform, capped 
contingency fees for attorneys, limits the percentage of 
the award collected by lawyers following successful 
trials.
California can be viewed as a case study in tort reform.  
California was one of the first states to pursue tort 
reform aggressively, according to the Philadelphia 
Inquirer (2003).  In 1975, California passed state passed 
the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, MICRA, 
which: capped pain and suffering awards to $250,000; 
enforced a collateral source rule; limited lawyers 
contingency fees to 40% for the first $50,000 awarded, 
33% for awards between $50,000-$100,000; 25% for 
the next half million; and 15% for amounts in excess of 
$600,000; reduced the statue of limitations to three 
years; and allowed periodic payments non-mandatory 
arbitration.  Then in 1991, Proposition 103 passed to 
mitigate rising insurance fees by requiring regulatory 
approval.  Today, states such as Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey look to the California system as a model, 
according to the Philadelphia Inquirer (2003).
Kessler and McClellan’s (1996) study examines how 
tort reform and malpractice environments impact 
defensive medicine.  They are interested in the effects 
of indirect and direct reforms on positive defensive 
medicine. This study focuses on cardiac patients.  The 
authors used a difference-in-difference analysis of 
longitudinal data on Medicare patients from 1984, 
1987, and 1990 who treated for acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) and new ischemic heart disease (IHD).  
They compared outcomes among states with reforms 
and without reforms.  Tort law reforms were divided 
into two categories: direct, which directly reduce 
expected malpractice awards such as damage caps and 
mandatory collateral-source offsets and indirect ones 
such as mandatory periodic payments, statute of 
limitations reductions, or modification of the joint and 
several liability rule, which have a less discernable 
impact on malpractice pressures.  Joint and several 
liability rules allocate payments according to degree of 
fault.   Kessler and McClellan examine the occurrence 
of adverse outcomes one year after cardiac illness, 
including subsequent AMI, heart failure requiring 
hospitalization, and mortality.  The magnitude of 
defensive medicine was estimated by the cost of an 
additional year of life to treatment intensity used.  
Results from their study indicate reform states and non-
reform states had similar baseline expenditures and 
outcomes.  However, expenditure growth was 2-6%
lower in reform states than in non-reform states for 
AMI. Trends for IHD showed slightly greater 
differences.  Expenditures in states adopting direct 
reforms declined 5.3% relative to non-reforming states 
and expenditures in states with indirect reforms 
increased 1.8% relative to non-reforming states.  The 
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adoption of malpractice reforms lead to reductions in 
hospital expenditures of 5% for AMI and 9% for IHD
by five years after reform adoption.  Overall, the results 
of the study show direct reforms reduce expenditure 
growth without increasing mortality, while indirect 
reforms have no substantial effects on expenditure or 
mortality.  
HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION MODEL OF 
DEFENSIVE MEDICINE
We build a healthcare utilization model to estimate the 
individual impacts of twelve tort reform measures.  The 
purpose of the analysis is to discover how state 
malpractice environments influence the practice of 
positive defensive medicine. The scope of the study is 
limited to patients with skull fractures.  Since these 
patients are associated with a high level of risk and 
uncertainty, it is likely that physicians practice 
defensive medicine on them.  Thus, reductions in state 
malpractice pressures could diminish the level of 
defensive medicine associated with these patients, and 
result in substantial cost savings.  The healthcare 
utilization model of defensive medicine is as follows:
CHARGES =   b0 + bPPatient Demographics + 
bHHospital Demographics + bTTort Reform + μ                                 
(1)
The dependent variable, total in-patient hospital 
expenditures (CHARGES), is used to assess the level of 
defensive medicine practiced in each state. To construct 
a model distinguishing the effect of state malpractice 
environmental factors from other factors contributing to 
variations in patients’ total expenditures, independent 
variable vectors accounting for patient, bP,  and hospital 
demographics, bH , have been included.  Dummy 
variables for various tort reforms serve as identifiable 
measures of differences in state malpractice 
environments.   Chart 1 gives the matrix describing tort 
reforms in each of the 23 states included in this 
analysis. Table 1 lists the 12 dummy variables for the 
malpractice tort laws created for each state.
Several variables within the patient demographic vector 
account for differences in patient’s hospital experiences 
and skull fracture injuries.  Ultimately each can be held 
constant to examine the role of tort reform on total 
charges, though each variable will have its own 
individual impact on charges.  A patient’s length of 
stay, number of diagnoses, and number of medical 
procedures, all indicators of the patient’s hospital 
experience, are expected to positively impact charges.  
Since hospitals charge a minimum daily fee for 
inpatient visits on top of charges associated with tests 
and procedures, increasing a patient’s length of stay or 
increasing the number of procedures performed will 
increase a patient’s total charges.  It is also reasonable 
to expect that a patient with more severe injuries will 
have more diagnoses recorded on his or her hospital 
encounter than a patient with less severe injuries; thus, 
the number of diagnoses on a patient’s hospital 
encounter serves as a proxy for the patient’s extent of 
injury.  All three variables are expected to have positive 
coefficients.
Other general patient demographics are also included in 
the patient demographic vector, as evident in Tables 2 
and 3.  The hospital demographic vector is made up of 
several variables, including variables describing 
hospital control, size, location, and teaching status.  If 
government and non-profit facilities are less cost-
conscious than for-profit facilities, they may have 
higher patient expenditures for patients with the same 
set of diagnoses, leading to an expected positive sign on 
the government and non-profit facilities coefficients.  
Since the other patient and hospital demographic 
variables are used as control variables to be held 
constant to discern the impact of individual tort 
variables, a full discussion of the remaining
coefficients’ expected signs is excluded. 
To consider differences in state malpractice 
environments, dummy variables for 12 various tort 
reforms are included in the model.  These reforms are: 
arbitration, pre-judgment measures, contingency fee 
caps, collateral source rules, damage caps, joint and 
several liability rules, periodic payments, physician 
compensation funds, and state’s statutes of limitations.  
Within these reforms, the effects of voluntary 
arbitration versus mandatory arbitration, and the option 
to elect periodic payments versus mandatory periodic 
payments are considered. Periodic payments imply the 
award is paid over time, not in a lump sum,  and they 
cease if the patient dies.   We also separate damage cap 
reforms into two groups: those that limit noneconomic 
or total awards and those that only limit punitive 
damage awards.  We hypothesize physicians working in 
states that have enacted malpractice tort reforms will 
feel less malpractice pressure than physicians working 
in states without malpractice reforms.  In turn, these 
physicians will practice less defensive medicine than 
their counterparts in non-reform states; they will not 
order as many additional tests and procedures out of 
fear of litigation.  Based on this, the above mentioned 
tort dummy variables are expected to have negative 
coefficients.
DATA
The data come from two major sources.  Information on 
total expenditures, patient demographics, and hospital 
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demographics for patients who had primary, secondary, 
or tertiary diagnoses of skull fractures were derived 
from the 2000 Nationwide Inpatient Sample, part of the 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project sponsored by 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.   The 
diagnoses codes for skull fractures are based on the 
ICD-9CM codes valid for the patient’s discharge date 
and include: 800.00-800.99 (fracture of skull vault), 
801.00-801.99 (fracture of skull base), and 803.00-
803.99 (other and unqualified skull fractures).  
Information on ICD-9-CM codes was obtained from a 
topsSearch ICD-9 Trial on e-mds.com and UMEA 
University’s online directory of ICD-9-CM 
International Coding Standard.  The data set contains 
7,450,992 inpatient hospital stays from 994 hospitals in 
28 states.  Concentrating on a significant number of 
skull fractures the data were limited to 23 states: 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wisconsin.
We understand significant differences in hospital 
charges can be due to extreme differences in patients.  
We attempt to make patients as similar as possible by 
using several restrictions on the patients considered in 
this study so that expenditure differences are more 
likely to be due to differences in state environments.   
Age is restricted to patients 18 to 65 old for two 
reasons.  First, minors are eliminated because they are 
subject to different malpractice statutes of limitations in 
many states.  Second, the elderly are eliminated because 
literature on malpractice suits has shown that successful 
elderly claimants are awarded low dollar amounts due 
to their advanced age.  Thus, theory holds that 
physicians are less likely to practice defensive on this 
demographic group.  Also, due to deteriorating health 
and health complications, the elderly are likely to be 
outliers with respect to length of stay, number of 
diagnoses, total charges, etc.  To further reduce outliers
patients considered in this study are restricted to those 
whose length of stay was ten days or less and who had 
ten or fewer diagnoses on their hospital encounter. 
Table 2 describes the means and standard deviations of 
the variables used in regression analysis.
The total charges obtained from the NIS are altered to 
consider state and regional variations in the price of
medical care services.  This is accomplished by 
dividing regional or city CPI data for a given state by a 
base state’s CPI, thereby setting patient charges from 
all states on equal footing.  CPI data for the year 2000 
were obtained from the Urban Consumer Series “All 
Items” CPI index available on Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ website.  If data for a metropolitan area 
within a given state were available or the state was cited 
as having a CPI value corresponding to a metropolitan 
area in a nearby state, this CPI value was used.  If data 
for several metropolitan areas within a state or 
corresponding to a state were available, the average of 
these values were used.  For states in which there were 
no corresponding metropolitan areas associated, the 
regional (Northeast, Midwest, South, or West) “All 
Items” Urban CPI value was used.  Kansas was selected 
as the base state in this analysis because of its baseline 
number of malpractice tort reforms.  This method of 
CPI base lining is the best approximation that can be 
made, given the limited amount of CPI information 
available for locations around the nation. 
The second major source of data, from which 
information on state tort laws is compiled, come from 
the American Medical Association Advocacy Resource 
Center’s state law charts on liability reform.  The 
dummy variables are listed in Table 2 for each state.  
Since the patient and hospital data are for 2000, we use 
the tort law in place in 1998 to allow for a two year, 
albeit arbitrary, lag for doctors to respond to incentives.
RESULTS
Regression results are reported in Table 3.  Using 
ordinary least squares, the adjusted R-squared value is 
48.62, implying 48.6% of the variation in total charges 
can be explained by the variation in the independent 
variables.  The mean total charge for patients with skull 
fractures is $21,127.  The condition index of 35.91 
suggests multicollinearity exists, but it is 
inconsequential in that numerous statistically 
coefficients with the expected sign are found.  Based on 
the results of White’s test, the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity was rejected.   The T-values are 
found using White’s consistent estimators of the
variance and are indicated in parentheses in below the 
coefficients in Table 3.
Table 3 shows each additional day in the hospital is 
expected to increase total charges by $3,191, ceteris 
paribus, whereas an additional procedure raises them by 
$3,716.  Similar interpretations of coefficients of the 
many statistically significant patient and hospital 
demographic variables are easily obtainable, but the 
thrust of this paper is on the reform coefficients.  
All but one tort reform, voluntary arbitration, is
statistically significant.   The tort reform with the 
largest coefficient, indicating the most important reform 
in terms of savings from reduced defensive medicine, is 
mandatory arbitration.  Having a provision for 
mandatory arbitration reduces total skull fracture 
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charges by $12,177, a significant amount compared to 
the dependent mean of $21,127.  This result supports 
the theory that physicians fear malpractice suits going 
to court and practice less defensive medicine when suits 
must first be assessed outside of court.  Interestingly, 
having a voluntary arbitration policy has no impact on 
charges, thus on defensive medicine, implying the 
policy needs to have teeth, i.e., be mandated.   Similar 
to mandatory arbitration, pre-judgment measures reduce 
charges by $5,174.99. Physicians will practice less 
defensive medicine if states screen claims before they 
can proceed to court because physicians are confident
an objective board will eliminate frivolous suits.  
Enacting contingency fee caps reduce charges by 
$4,534.50 or 20% of the average charges.  A possible 
explanation for this reduction is that caps force 
attorneys to more closely scrutinize potential cases, 
resulting in fewer malpractice cases going to court.  In 
turn, physicians may feel less pressure to practice 
defensive medicine due to the reduced frequency, and 
therefore probability, of malpractice court cases being 
filed.
Physicians may order fewer extraneous tests or 
procedures when they have a decreased risk of having 
their assets wiped out in a malpractice suit.  The fear of 
litigation rises with the size of the expected payout.  
Doctors are not only concerned with the immediate 
payouts they may incur, but the impact on their 
insurance premium.  Policies reducing the expected 
payout, such as periodic payments and joint and several 
liability rules, are expected to reduce defensive 
medicine.  Making physicians responsible for the same 
proportion of damages as their actions though the joint 
and several liability rule reduces charges by $2,474.77. 
Mandatory periodic payments reduce charges by 
$7,842.91.  Additionally, the existence of state 
physician compensation funds reduces defensive 
medical care by $1,856.49.   Here, states pick up the 
portion of the payout above what the insurer will pay on 
behalf of the doctor.  Interestingly, permitting periodic 
payment actually increases total charges by $2,775.17, 
in contrast with expectations.  
Some results are contrary to expectations.  The 
coefficient on the statute of limitations variable 
indicates that for each additional year a patient is able 
to take medical liability action, there is a $1,504.69 
decrease in total charges for skull fracture patients.  
Theory predicts allowing patients an additional year to 
take action will increase the volume of malpractice 
claims filed, thus causing physicians to practice more 
defensive medicine; if a physician knows that a patient 
has more years in which he or she can file a malpractice 
suit, then perhaps the physician orders more tests for 
protection from a suit claiming that the proper standard 
of care was not met. More research on the relationship 
between defensive medicine and statute of limitations 
reductions is needed before firm conclusions can be 
drawn.
In contrast to theory, the collateral source rule and 
damage cap reforms significantly increase total charges.  
Having a collateral source reform, which eliminates 
double dipping for awards, increases charges by 
$3,866.88.  Caps on noneconomic or total awards 
increase charges by $2,584.30, while caps on punitive 
damages only increase charges by $2,226.01. A 
possible explanation for these unexpected results is they 
result from an endogenous relationship between tort 
reforms and state malpractice environments.  Tort 
reforms are generally enacted in states after some sort 
of malpractice crisis exists.  These crises resulting from 
long claim tails, high numbers of malpractice suits, and 
severe damage awards, are often manifested through 
large annual physician malpractice premium increases; 
reforms on the collateral source rule and damage caps 
are generally enacted when a state is in crisis.  Thus, the 
significantly positive coefficients on collateral source 
rule reforms, noneconomic/total award damage caps, 
and punitive damage caps most likely reflect this 
endogenous relationship between states in malpractice 
crises and the reforms they enact.  The positive 
coefficients may reflect lingering crises effects 
originating before the reforms were enacted.  
CONCLUSIONS
The regression results provide strong evidence that 
variations in state malpractice environments 
significantly influence the level of defensive medicine 
practiced by physicians on skull fracture patients.   On 
the upper end, states enacting mandatory arbitration 
could reduce charges by $12,177, over half the mean 
hospital charge for skull fracture patients.  Those 
enacting various pre-judgment measures could save 
$5,175, whereas capping attorney fees could save 
$4,534 per skull fracture patient.   States mandating 
periodic payment of awards could also significantly 
reduce defensive medical charges by $7,843 per skull 
fracture patient. In contrast, damage caps and collateral-
source rule reforms increase patient expenditures. 
The results are consistent with some of Kessler and 
McClellan’s (1996) findings, though contrary to others.  
Both studies find that joint and several liability rules 
and mandatory periodic payments reduce patient 
expenditures.  Kessler and McClellan (1996), however, 
show damage caps reduce expenditures, contrary to 
findings here.  Danzon (1986) finds damage caps 
decrease claims severity, but not their frequency.  If this 
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is the case, then physicians do not perceive a reduced 
likelihood of being sued with damage caps in place and 
thus do not practice less defensive medicine, which 
would contradict Kessler and McClellan’s findings.  
The positive coefficient on damage caps here is not 
inconsistent with Danzon, and as mentioned previously, 
the endogeniety between higher medical costs 
malpractice crises may best explain it.
The major weakness of this study is that health 
outcomes are not held constant due to lack of data 
availability.  Kessler and McClellan (1996) found no 
evidence of differences in health outcomes, and we take 
the liberty of presuming that would be the case with 
skull fracture patients.  Despite this limitation, the 
results suggest significant costs savings from reduced 
defensive medicine.  Based on the national estimate by 
Kraus et AL. (1996) that approximately 2 million head
injuries occur each year, enacting mandatory arbitration 
could save over $24 billion in skull fracture defensive 
medical practices.   Considering this estimate represents 
savings from only one percent of the total patient 
population, policy makers should seriously consider the 
impact of state malpractice tort reforms on the practice 
of defensive medicine.
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Chart 1                                        Malpractice Tort Laws Used in Analysis.
Reform Description of reform
Arbitration (Permitted) Arbitration is permitted, but not mandated.
Arbitration (Mandatory) Arbitration is mandated.
Pre-judgment Claimants need to obtain a certificate of affidavit of merit within a certain amount of time in 
order to pursue medical liability action.
Contingency Fee Cap The proportion of an award that an attorney can contractually charge is statutorily capped at 
a specific level.
Statute of Limitations The maximum number of years (from incident occurrence, discovery, or the maximum time 
limit) during which a claimant can commence an action for medical liability
Collateral Source Rule Reform Damages payable in a malpractice suit are statutorily reduced by all or part of the dollar 
value of collateral-source payments to the plaintiff.
Damage Caps (noneconomic 
or total damages)
Either noneconomic, total damages, or both types of damages are capped at a statutorily 
established dollar amount.
Damage Caps (punitive 
damages)
Punitive damages are capped at a statutorily established dollar amount.
Joint and Several Liability 
Rule Reform
The Joint and Several Liability rule is abolished either for noneconomic or total damages in 
all claims, such that damages payable in a malpractice suit are statutorily allocated in 
proportion to the tortfeasors’ degree of fault.
Periodic Payment of Awards 
(Permitted)
Part or all of the damages are permitted to be disbursed in the form of an annuity that pays 
out over time. 
Periodic Payment of Awards 
(Mandatory)
Part or all of the damages must to be disbursed in the form of an annuity that pays out over 
time.
Physician Compensation Fund A state-administered excess malpractice liability insurance program exists for physicians.
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Table 1                                         State Tort Coding Matrix
State Arbit PreJudge ContFeeCap StatLim CollSoRef DamCap JntSevL PeriodPay PCF
AZ 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0
CA 1 0 1 3 1        1 0 1 0
CO 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 2 0
CT 1 0 1 3 1 0 1 1 0
FL 1 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 1
IL 0 1 1 4 1 0 0 1 0
KS 1 1 0 4 0 1 1 1 0
KY 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
MA 0 0 1 7 1 1 0 0 0
MD 2 1 0 5 0 1 0 1 0
MO 0 1 0 10 0 1 0 1 0
NC 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
NJ 0 1 1 2 1 2        1 0 0
NY 1 1 1 2.5 1 0 1 2 0
OR 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0
PA 1 0 0 7 0 2 0 1 1
SC 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 1
TN 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 0
TX 1 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 0
VA 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0
WA 2 0 0 8 1 0 0 1 0
WI 1 0 1 5 1 1 1 1 1
GA 1 1 0 5 0 2 0 0 0
STATE TORT CODING KEY *
*All reforms took effect in prior to 1998 in order to allow for lag time between tort reform enactment and physician behavior 
change.
Arbitration:
Arbit= 0 if there are no provisions for arbitration.
Arbit= 1 if there arbitration is permitted (voluntary) .
(In regression analysis transformed to: ArbitVol= 1.)
Arbit= 2 if there arbitration is mandatory .
(In regression analysis transformed to: ArbitMand= 1.) 
Pre-judgment measures:
PreJudge= 0 if claimants do not need to obtain a certificate/affidavit of merit within a certain amount of time in order 
to pursue a medical liability action .
PreJudge= 1 if claimants must (mandated) file a certificate/affidavit of merit within a certain amount of time in order 
to pursue a medical liability action .
Contingency Fee Caps:
ContFeeCap= 0 if contingency fees are not capped (This includes  HI, IA, and WA where courts must approve/determine 
reasonable contingency fees.)
ContFeeCap= 1 if contingency fees are capped.
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Statute of Limitations:
StatLim=  #.   This number is the maximum number of years (from incident occurrence or discovery) during which a claimant 
can commence an action for medical liability.  In cases where there were different time limits for occurrence, discovery, or a 
maximum statute of limitations I have used the maximum time limit.
Collateral Source Rule:
CollSoRef= 0 if the collateral source rule is in effect (juries cannot consider claimants’ external compensation sources).
CollSoRef= 1 if the collateral source rule has been reformed such that juries are permitted to consider claimants’ external 
compensation sources.
Damage Caps:
DamCap= 0 if there are no caps on any type of damage award .
DamCap= 1 if there are caps on noneconomic/total damages.
(In regression analysis transformed to: DamCapNT= 1.)
DamCap= 2 if there are caps on punitive damages only
(In regression analysis transformed to: DamCapPun= 1.)
Joint and Several Liability Rule:
JntSevL= 0 if joint and several liability is in effect (joint tortfeasors are each responsible for the entire judgment)
JntSevL= 1 if joint and several liability has been reformed such that damages are allocated in proportion to tortfeasors’ degree 
of fault)
Periodic Payment of damages:
PeriodPay= 0 if there are no provisions for periodic payments of damages
PeriodPay= 1 if periodic payment of damages is permitted, but mandated
(In regression analysis transformed to: PerPayPerm = 1.)
PeriodPay= 2 if periodic payment of damages is mandated
(In regression analysis transformed to: PerPayMand = 1.)
Physician Compensation Funds:
PCF= 0 if the state did not have a patient compensation fund in 2000.
PCF= 1 if the state had a patient compensation fund in 2000.
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations of variables used in regression analysis.
Variables             Mean
Standard      
Deviation
Patient Demographics
    (AGE): Age 35.190 12.499
    (FEMALE): Gender 0.190 0.392
    (MEDICAID): Medicaid Insurance 0.101 0.301
    (PRIVATE): Private Insurance 0.476 0.499
    (TWENTYFIVE): Income $25,000-34,999 0.277 0.448
    (THIRTYFIVE): Income $35,000-44,999 0.256 0.438
    (FORTYFIVE): Income $45,000 + 0.312 0.463
Patient Hospital Stay Demographics
    (LOS): Length of Stay 3.584 2.634
    (NDX): Number of Diagnoses 5.854 2.438
    (NPR): Number of Procedures 2.182 2.329
Hospital Demographics
    (TEACH): Teaching facility 0.572 0.499
    (URBAN): Urban location 0.885 0.319
    (LARGE): Large size 0.690 0.462
    (PUBLIC): Public facility 0.087 0.282
    (VOLUNTARY): Non-profit facility 0.149 0.356
Malpractice Tort Law Reforms
    (ARBITVOL): Arbitration- Voluntary 0.617 0.486
    (ARBITMAND): Arbitration- Mandatory 0.098 0.298
    (PREJUDGE): Pre-judgment 0.535 0.499
    (CONTFEECAP): Contingency Fee Cap 0.466 0.497
    (STATLIM): Statute of Limitations 3.950 2.009
    (COLLSOREF): Collateral Source Rule 0.537 0.499
    (DAMCAPNT): Damage Caps- Noneconomic/Total damages 0.404 0.491
    (DAMCAPPUN): Damage Caps- Punitive 0.207 0.405
    (JNTSEVL): Joint and Several Liability 0.622 0.485
    (PERPEYPERM): Periodic Payment- Permitted 0.582 0.493
    (PERPAYMAND): Periodic Payment- Mandatory 0.095 0.293
    (PCF): Physician Compensation Fund 0.201 0.400
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Table 3.  Regression Results. (T values in parentheses.)a
Adjusted R2 = 0.4862      Condition Index = 35.91244                 Dependent Mean (Total Charges) =  $21,127
Variables
Coefficient 
Estimatesb Variables Coefficient Estimatesa
Intercept -$130.98
(-0.06)
Patient Demographics Malpractice Tort Law Reforms
    (AGE): Age -$130.98
(-0.83)
(ARBITVOL): Arbitration- Voluntary    $686.81
    (0.67)
    (FEMALE): Gender -$17.34**
(-2.71)
(ARBITMAND): Arbitration-
Mandatory
   -$12,177.00***
    (-10.40)
    (MEDICAID): Medicaid Insurance $3,596.63**
(2.85)
(PREJUDGE): Pre-judgment    -$5,174.99***
    (-6.18)
    (PRIVATE): Private Insurance $30.30
(0.06)
(CONTFEECAP): Contingency Fee 
Cap
   -$4,534.50***
    (-5.27)
    (TWENTYFIVE): Income $25,000-34,999 -$1,535.95
(-1.54)
(STATLIM): Statute of Limitations    -$1,504.69***
    (-8.98)
    (THIRTYFIVE): Income $35,000-44,999 -$1,410.69
(-1.50)
(COLLSOREF): Collateral Source Rule    $3,866.88***
    (4.73)
    (FORTYFIVE): Income $45,000 + $1,841.90
(1.90)*
(DAMCAPNT): Damage Caps-
Noneconomic/Total
   $2,584.30***
   (3.97)
Patient Hospital Stay Demographics (DAMCAPPUN): Damage Caps-
Punitive
   $2,226.01**
    (2.01)
    (LOS): Length of Stay $3,191.70***
(25.59)
(JNTSEVL): Joint and Several Liability    -$2,474.77**
    (-2.69)
    (NDX): Number of Diagnoses $191.68
(1.59)
(PERPAYPERM): Periodic Payment-
Permitted
   $2,775.17***
    (3.48)
    (NPR): Number of Procedures $3,716.70***
(15.88)
(PERPAYMAND): Periodic Payment-
Mandatory
   -$7,842.91***
    (-5.32)
Hospital Demographics (PCF): Physician Compensation Fund    -$1,856.49**
    (-2.03)
    (TEACH): Teaching facility $654.39
(0.64)
a T values produced using White’s consistent 
estimators of the variance.
    (URBAN): Urban location $7,063.70***
(8.29)
b All coefficient estimates have been deflated to 2000 dollars.
    (URBAN): Large size $3,954.61***
(7.22)
   *Significant at the 10% confidence level.
    (PUBLIC): Public facility $2,686.13**
(2.29)
 **Significant at the 5% confidence level.
    (VOLUNTARY): Non-profit facility $2,714.92**
(2.00)
***Significant at the 1% confidence level.
